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I study how the pattern of segmentation in the Euro area money market has
been a®ected by the recent turmoil in ¯nancial markets. I use nonparametric
estimates of realized volatility to test for volatility spillovers between rates at
di®erent maturities. For the pre-turmoil period, exogeneity tests from VAR
models suggest the presence of a transmission channel from longer maturities
to the overnight. This disappears in the subsample starting in August 9 2007.
Quantile measures of comovements in volatility report evidence of an increase
in contagion within the longer end of the money market curve.
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11 Introduction
The decisions of the Governing Council of the European Central Bank on the key
interest rate are implemented through money market channels. The monetary policy
stance is signalled by setting the minimum bid rate, which is the lower limit on the
price paid by private banks at the weekly main re¯nancing operations of the ECB.
These operations take the form of variable rate tenders where bids are allotted pro
rata. As an alternative source, banks can gather liquidity also through the interbank
market. In order to drive market rates to a desired level, the European Central Bank
conducts open market operations. Although explicit targets are not announced, the
practice suggests that the ECB aims to stabilize short term rates around the policy
rate.
In this context, the overnight segment of the interbank money market plays a key
role in signalling the policy stance. As noticed by the ECB (2005b, 2006), not only
is it crucial for the volatility of the overnight rates to remain low.1 ECB (2005b)
points out that the monetary policy stance should be a®ected only by the decision
on the key interest rates. The so-called proposition of neutrality is a backbone of
the conduct of liquidity policy of the ECB, which is best explained by Trichet (2007)
\I would emphasize that our primary mandate calls for our monetary
policy stance to deliver price stability in the medium term. Once the
level of interest rates is decided we have the responsibility to ensure the
smooth functioning of the segment of the money market that we in°uence.
The two responsibilities are clearly separated and should not be mixed."
In other words, the provision of liquidity is guided solely by the need to smooth
out liquidity shocks, and interest rate expectations at long maturities should be
decoupled from the evolution of the daily liquidity conditions.
The neutrality of the liquidity policy is discussed in a number of contributions
such as Alonso and Blanco (2005), ECB (2005b, 2007) and Durr¶ e and Nardelli
(2008). Alonso and Blanco (2005) estimate univariate models of conditional
volatility where interactions between rates at di®erent maturities are modelled
through dummy variables. They ¯nd evidence of interactions generated in a sample
until November 2003. Durr¶ e and Nardelli (2008) stress the role of the microstructure
of the money market. They use high frequency data to compute nonparametric
estimates of the daily realized volatility. Estimated impulse responses in vector
1This has also provided a reason for the changes to the operational framework introduced in
March 2004. In order to prevent excessive bidding from taking place during the main re¯nancing
operations, the Governing Council decided to change the timing of the reserve maintenance period,
and to shorten the maturity of the main re¯nancing operations to one week. ECB (2005a, 2006)
show that the operational changes have reduced the volatility of the overnight interest rate.
2autoregressions suggest that the liquidity management carried out by the ECB does
not a®ect the transmission mechanism along the money market yield curve. Zagaglia
(2008) studies the transmission of volatility shocks arising from the longer end of
the money market maturity curve to the short end. The results suggest that the
reform of March 2004 has insulated the overnight segment from spillovers in volatility
arising from rates of up to 6 months of maturity.
In this paper, I investigate the overall pattern of transmission of volatility shocks
along the money market term structure, running also from the long to the overnight
end of the curve. This is the so-called `segmentation' of the money market. There
are two aspects of segmentation that bear policy relevance. As suggested earlier,
the ¯rst one has to do with the transmission of volatility shocks. The eventual
presence of spillovers from long maturities to the overnight can shed light on the
role of liquidity policy, and on its ability to control the overnight segment e®ectively.
On the other hand, the transmission of volatility across money market rates at long
maturities can a®ect the stability of expectations formation, thus adding a potential
source of noise to the monetary transmission mechanism. The second dimension has
to do with the ability of monetary policy to steer average interest rates at horizons
beyond the overnight. Although the ability of the ECB to control the stability of
monetary policy and in°ationary expectations embedded in the money market curve
has received no academic attention, here I focus on the volatility aspect.
The key economic event that has characterized the world economy since 2007 is
the eruption of a `turmoil' in ¯nancial markets. The turmoil started from concerns
related to the US subprime market in June 2007. This led to a reassessment of credit
and liquidity risk along a large number of asset classes. The lack of con¯dence on
the evaluation of bonds related to subprime loans has spilled over into the money
markets around the globe. The result became evident on August 9 2007, when
liquidity dried up both in the overnight and in the segments at longer maturities.
The ECB, the Federal Reserve System and the Bank of Japan provided emergency
liquidity to the markets.
Academic contributions on the impact of turmoil on the Euro area money market
have been limited. The only exception is Idier and Nardelli (2008), who study
the transmission of information in the overnight market. Against this background,
I investigate how the turmoil has a®ected the existing pattern of money market
segmentation. I use the nonparametric estimates of volatility of Durr¶ e and Nardelli
(2008) to test for volatility spillovers between rates of di®erent maturities through
two di®erent statistical methods. I compute tests for block exogeneity and Granger
causality in vector autoregressions with realized volatilities. To investigate the
robustness of the results, I also apply the semiparametric tests for `contagion' of
3Cappiello, Gerard and Manganelli (2005). These are capable of accounting properly
for the tail behaviour generated by extreme events, like the turmoil.
For the pre-turmoil period, the exogeneity tests suggest the presence of a
transmission channel from longer maturities to the overnight. This channel
disappears in the subsample starting in August 9 2007, indicating that the turmoil
has increased the degree of segmentation of the money market. The results of the
semiparametric tests of Cappiello, Gerard and Manganelli (2005) report evidence of
an increase in volatility contagion within the longer end of the money market curve.
However this takes place in the lower tail of the empirical distributions.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a selected overview of the
main institutional aspects of the Euro area money market. Section 3 summarizes
the events leading to the spillover of the ¯nancial markerts turmoil into the money
market. Section 4 describes the dataset on realized volatilities, and outlines the
testing frameworks used in the empirical exercise. The results are discussed in
section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2 An overview of the structure of the Euro area money
market
The Member States share a uni¯ed money market where the implementation of
monetary policy is decentralized and carried out by national central banks. The
functioning of the operational framework is grounded on two aspects. First, the
ECB carries out a number of open market operations including the weekly main
re¯nancing operations and the longer term re¯nancing operations. A total of 1967
¯nancial institutions across the Euro area are eligible to borrow against collateral.
However, as noted by Durr¶ e and Nardelli (2008), the e®ective number of participants
is rather limited. Under the operational framework, banks face also compulsory
reserve requirements that are held at national central banks over a `maintenance
period', which lasts four weeks on average. Since the requirement works on `average',
banks can smooth out the impact of liquidity shocks on their funding needs, thus
stabilizing the money market at the shortest maturities.2
The money market is divided into cash and derivatives segments. Banks use
the unsecured market for the management of their contingent liquidity needs.
Transactions take place both over-the-counter (direct dealing) and through electronic
centralized platform. An example of the latter is represented by e-MID, which is
2The interested reader can refer to ECB (2004) for a thorough description of the operating
framework.
4run by e-MID S.p.A. Milan.3 It should be pointed out, however, that electronic
trading accounts only for 17% of market activity in unsecured markets (see Idier
and Nardelli, 2008). This is due both to institutional factors that limit the access
to trading on electronic platforms,4 and to the fact that reputation matters for
contracting schemes that require no collateral.
Although strongly concentrated on overnight maturity, the unsecured markets
provide rates for maturities from the overnight up to one year. The main benchmarks
are the Euro overnight index average (Eonia) and the Euro interbank o®ered rate
(Euribor). The Eonia consists of the weighted average of unsecured loans provided
by a panel of banks. The Euribor, instead, is the reference rate on the longer
maturities. The cash markets also include forms of collateralised lending through
repo and swaps against foreign currencies. Finally, the derivatives segment includes
trading on Eonia swaps and Euribor futures.
The structure of the money market de¯nes the functioning of the monetary
transmission mechanism. The weekly main re¯nancing operations have a direct
impact on the overnight markets. At the same time, both the allotment outcomes
from the main re¯nancing operations, and markets' expectations of future policy
rates a®ect the entire maturity structure of the money market. The prescription
of neutrality of the liquidity policy of the ECB indicates that the volatility of the
overnight segment is not to spill over into the longer end of the maturity structure.
Notwithstanding, changes in the average rates ought to be transmitted throughout
the entire maturity spectrum.
3 A short anatomy of the turmoil
The ¯rst semester of 2007 was characterized by a rather favourable environment for
¯nancial markets. A strong macroeconomic outlook provided the background for
expected buoyant pro¯tability of the corporate sector. Doubts about the health of
the US mortgage markets were raised in June 2007. Investors awareness focused
on `subprime' loans, mainly consisting of residential loans provided to distressed
borrowers.
Table 1 reports the timeline of major events. On June 15, Moody's announced
negative ratings on 267 securities backed by subprime mortgages. On June 20, two
Bear Stearns hedge funds reported large losses related to the subprime market, and
ended up almost closed. A number of negative news followed. On July 10, Standard
and Poor's assigned negative ratings to a large fraction of the loans of one of the
3Beaupain and Durr¶ e (2008) study transaction pattern in the overnight market of e-MID.
4Only banks with a net worth of 10 million USDs at least can participate in e-MID.
5largest US home lender. Despite this, there were only marginal signs of spillover of
tensions into across ¯nancial markets.
The crisis of con¯dence emerged at the end of July. On July 30, the German bank
IKB warned of large losses related to investments in the US subprime market. A
bailout by state-owned German banks followed. On August 17, another German
bank, SachsenLB, became the victim of losses in asset backed securities. This
generated a repricing of risk and a surge in risk aversion by investors (see ECB,
2008).
On August 9, the overnight rate rose signi¯cantly above the minimum bid rate
(approximately 70 basis points) following rumours on the ¯nancial health of the
Franch bank BNP Paribas. Liquidity dried up and the ECB conduced a ¯ne tuning
operation (FTO) by allotting EUR 98.84 billion in a ¯xed rate tender. A second
FTO took place in the following day, bringing down the overnight rate by six basis
points on average. The ECB intervened also on August 13, jointly with the Federal
Reserve System. During the weekly main re¯nancing operation of August 14, the
ECB allotted EUR 310 billion. On August 17, the Fed started recognizing the
gravity of the situation, and cut the discount rate by 50 basis points.
After August 14, the tensions started easing in the shorter maturities, although
spreads kept high by historical standard. However, the release of tensions on the
lower end of the money market curve did not a®ect the longer maturities, with banks
refusing to o®er term liquidity both in the secured and in the unsecured segments.
As a results, three-month Euribor rates rose from 4.22% at the beginning of August
to 4.75% by the end of the month.
A number of policymakers identi¯es the complexity of the securitization process
as the main cause of the turmoil (eg see Gonzalez-Paramo, 2008). Banks have
generated a number of instrument, mainly asset backed securities and collateralised
debt obligations, that has allowed them to package loans with di®erent risk pro¯les,
and to sell them to investors. The rationale for such instruments consists in the
capability of spreading risk among a larger pool of agents. However, their intrinsic
opacity has made it di±cult for investors to price correctly the risk beared by the
securities.
There are several reasons why the ¯nancial turmoil has hit the Euro area money
market. Asset backed securities linked to US subprime loans were used in the
secured segments of the market. The inability to price these assets, especially in
circumstances of evaporation of liquidity, has generated distrust among banks that
previously used asset backed securities as collateral. The crisis of con¯dence has
involved the ¯nancial health of counterparties in the money market. Furthermore,
it can be argued that banks have found it di±cult to evaluate their own positions
6with respect to envisaged losses. Thus banks have been keen on hoarding cash for
precautionary reasons in case their exposure to subprime losses would prevent from
raising funds at times of need.
4 Tests on high-frequency data
4.1 The measure of realized volatility
The estimation of volatility is a key issue in ¯nancial econometrics. Standard
measure of volatility based on GARCH models rely on both parametric and
distributional assumptions that can hardly be tested at times. Andersen, Bollerslev
and Diebold (2002) suggests a nonparametric measure that relies on the availability
of high frequency data. The construction of the estimator is based on an
approximating process for the price of the underlying asset in continuous time
dpt = ®tdt + ¾tdWt; (1)
where t is a compact time interval, pt indicates the price (in logarithm), ®t is a
drift term, and Wt is a Brownian motion. I can also de¯ne a measure of integrated






This equation indicates the summation of the instantaneous variance of the asset
price over a time interval t. Hanse and Lunde (2006) suggest approximating the
expression in equation 2 by using quadratic variations. Denote by rt = pt ¡ pt¡1
the asset return over period t. Given m time partitions of a trading day, integrated









i;t;j is the intraday return over a sampling interval of length j. Andersen,
Bollerslev and Diebold (2002) prove that RV
(m)
i;t converges uniformly in probability
to IVt as the time partition m approaches zero. The discussion above suggests that
the sampling frequency is important in obtaining a proper volatility measure. There
is a tradeo® at work in this case. The higher the sampling frequency, the stronger
the role of microstructure e®ects in the estimation of integrated volatility. However,
at higher frequencies, the researcher can face the issue of missing data. Resampling
tick data helps overcoming this problem, but introduces an additional source of mean
7square error. Bandi and Russell (2008) suggest using data sampled at a 5-minute
frequency at most as a proper strategy.
4.2 The dataset
I use estimates of realized volatility for the overnight, one, three, six and
twelve-month interest rates on the Euribor market. Although this paper focuses
on the transmission of shocks within the longer end of the money market curve, it is
important to account for the indirect channels of transmission in order to minimize
the impact of model misspeci¯cation. Rates are computed from midpoints of bid-ask
spread obtained from Reuters. In order to restrict the sampling to the trading hours
when most of the trading takes place, intraday returns are computed on rates from
8am to 7pm CET. The number of intraday observation varies around a mean of
120 data points. The daily estimates of realized volatility for national holidays have
been removed from the sample. The ¯nal dataset spans from November 11 2000 to
March 18 2008. There are 1867 observations, out of which 1711 for the subsample
until August 8 2007 and 157 for the subsample after August 8 2007.
In the following sections, I estimate a VAR model of the maturity structure of
realized volatility. Given the presence of the overnight maturity, the VAR includes
three exogenous variables that are related to the institutional aspects and the
calendar e®ects present in the Euro area money market. The ¯rst variable takes the
value 1 for the six days before the end of the maintenance period, when the reserve
requirements become more binding, and zero otherwise. The second variable assigns
the value 1 to the last day of a business month, as the uncertainty surrounding the
demand for liquidity increases in this period. An additional dummy is included with
the value 1 for the days when a monetary policy decision takes place.
Figure 1 plots the realized volatility (in logarithm) for the four maturities
considered in the paper. Strikingly, the turmoil does not show up by simply
eyeballing the ¯gures. In fact, the dynamics of the estimated volatilities before and
during the turmoil doe not di®er markedly. This is also re°ected in table 2, which
reports some descriptive statistics. According to panels (a) and (c), the realized
volatilities before the turmoil are both higher on average and more variable than
that those of the turmoil period. However, the picture changes if one considers the
beginning of the sharp drop in volatilities dated at the beginning of January 2006.
A comparison with the period between January 1 2006 and August 8 2007 retrieves
the properties of the turmoil that one would expect to see in the data, namely that
the money market term structure during the turmoil displays larger variability on
average. Also, the °uctuations in realized volatility are closer to the mean during
the turmoil period.
84.3 Block-exogeneity tests
Let the vector xt = [on 1m 3m 6m 1y]0 collect the realized volatilities for the
di®erent maturities, where on denotes the overnight and the rest of the vector xt
refers to the rest of the term structure. I assume that the shocks propagate across
maturities according to the VAR in structural form
A0xt = k +
q X
i=1
Aixt¡i + ²t (4)
This model can be rewritten in reduced form as
xt = k +
q X
i=1
Bixt¡i + ut (5)
In order to give an example on the interpretation of the test, assume that there is no
transmission of shocks from the 1-year segment to the rest of the maturity structure.











for i = 1;:::m.
Block exogeneity of the 1-year maturity tests if 6 holds. This amounts to
estimating an unrestricted VAR, where all the maturities enter the system, and
a restricted VAR, which excludes the 1-year segment. Given the variance-covariance
matrix ­U of the unrestricted model, and the variance-covariance matrix ­R of the
restricted model, the likelihood ratio test statistics LR can be computed
LR = (T ¡ p)(logj­Rj ¡ logj­Uj); (7)
where T is the number of observations, p indicates the number of parameters of the
unrestricted system, and j­j denotes the determinant of ­. The null hypothesis is
that the block of restricted variables does not enter remaining part of the system.
The test statistics is asymptotically distributed as a Â2 with degrees of freedom
equal to the number of restrictions in the system.
4.4 Quantile measures of comovements
The testing framework for volatility spillovers discussed in the previous section is
based on the assumption that linear VARs provide a reasonable description of the
9linkages between the volatilities of the rates at various maturities. The realized
volatilities are assumed to be normally distributed, and so are their volatilities.
Somehow at odds with the evidence of excess kurtosis reported in table 2, the
normality assumption implies a loss of the information contained in the tails of
the empirical distribution.
For these reasons, I use the semiparametric method for measuring comovements
proposed by Cappiello, Gerard and Manganelli (2005). These tests allow to
measure the transmission of shocks, or `contagion', between returns by avoiding
distributional assumptions. It should be stressed that, di®erently from available
empirical literature (eg see Cappiello et al., 2006), the statistical framework of
Cappiello, Gerard and Manganelli (2005) is applied to the realized volatility of
the money market rates. The reason is that I am interested in the transmission
of volatility spillovers, and not in the comovements between the levels of the rates.
Let frvi;tgT
t=1 and frvj;tgT
t=1 denote the time series of realized volatilities on two
di®erent maturities. De¯ne by q
rvi
µ;i the µ¡quantile of the conditional distribution of
rvi;t at time t. Ft(rvi;rvj) denotes the conditional cumulative joint distribution of
the two volatilities. Finally,
F¡
t (rvijrvj) := prob(rvi;t · rvijrvj;t · rvj) (8)
F+















µ;t ) if µ > 0:5:
(10)
can be used to represent the characteristics of Ft(rvi;rvj). In fact, pt(µ) measures the
probability that the volatilities at maturity i are below its µ¡quantile, conditional
on the same event occurring at maturity j. Since the shape of pt(µ) depends on
the joint distribution of the two time series, it can be derived only by numerical
simulation.
The framework of Cappiello, Gerard and Manganelli (2005) can also be used to
test whether the dependence between two markets has changed over time. Denote
by pA(µ) := A¡1 P
t<¿ pt(µ) and pB(µ) := B¡1 P
t<¿ pt(µ) the average conditional
probabilities before and after a certain event occurs at a threshold ¿, with A and
B the number of corresponding observations. Let ¢(µ;µ) denote the area between
pA(µ) and pB(µ). A measure of contagion or spillovers between the two markets can







dµ > 0: (11)
It should be stressed that ¢(µ;µ) allows to study changes in codependence over
speci¯c quantiles of the distribution.
Cappiello, Gerard and Manganelli (2005) show that the average conditional
probability p(µ) can be estimated from the regression
I
ri;rj
t (^ ¯µ) = ®1
µ + ®2
µDT
t + ²t; (12)
where hats denote estimated values, and
I
ri;rj













for each µ¡quantile, and D¿
t is a dummy variable for the test period t > ¿. The
OLS estimators of the regression 12 are asymptotically consistent estimators of the




! E [pt(µ)jperiod A] ´ pA(µ)
^ ®1
µ + ^ ®2
µ
p
! E [pt(µ)jperiod B] ´ pB(µ)
(14)
where hats denote estimates. This results also suggests a way of testing for market
integration
^ ¢(µ;µ) = (#µ)¡1 P
µ2[µ;µ]
£






where #µ denotes the number of terms in the summation.
5 Results
I estimate a VAR with the vector xt of endogenous variables, and with dummies for
the last days of the maintenance period (lastdays), the end of the month (endm),
and governing council decisions (pc).5 For mere reasons of brevity, table 3 reports
the coe±cient estimates of the dummies. The ¯rst question of is interest is whether
the turmoil has a®ected the systematic reaction of the volatilities to the institutional
5The lag length is chosen by minimizing the BIC criterion. This choice helps dealing with short
sample available after August 8 2007. For the pre-turmoil model, 4 lags are used, whereas the model
estimated on the turmoil sample includes 1 lag.
11framework.
For the pre-turmoil sample, only the volatility of the overnight rate has a
statistically signi¯cant coe±cient on the last days and end-of-month dummies.
The overnight rate, however, does not respond to the governing council dummy.
This captures the institutional pattern described earlier, and replicates one of the
¯ndings of Durr¶ e and Nardelli (2008). Interestingly, the deposit rates from one
month to one year of maturity have a signi¯cant relation with the days of governing
council decisions. The coe±cient has a positive sign, implying that monetary policy
decisions are associated with heightened uncertainty in the money market.6 As
shown in panel (b) of table 3, these patterns break down after the turmoil, as none
of the estimated coe±cients is signi¯cant.
Additional information on systematic patterns can be obtained from the forecast
error variance decomposition, reported in table 4.7 The maturities from 6 to 12
months explain only a small fraction of the forecast error of the overnight and
the 1-month rate independently from the subsample. In correspondence with the
turmoil, shorter maturities carry a larger fraction of explained variance for the longer
end of the money market curve (see panels (c){(e)).
Table 5 reports the results of the block exogeneity tests before and during the
turmoil. The key result is contained in the ¯rst row, which imposes the restriction
that all the lags of the maturities longer than the overnight enter a regression with
the Eonia rate with statistically signi¯cant coe±cients. The zero p¡values indicate
rejections of the null of block exogeneity for the pre-turmoil period. This means that
the volatility of the overnight rate is a®ected by the pooled information embodied
in longer maturities. The turmoil has changed this landscape, as the volatility of
the Eonia is insulated from spillovers from the longer maturities. This raises the
question of the contribution of each rate to the interactions between rates.
Tables 6 displays the Wald test statistics on the lags of the restricted variables
for ¯rst row of the VAR model 3, i.e. the equation for the overnight rate. Before
August 9 2007, the volatility of the overnight is a®ected by the volatility of the 1
and 3-month rates. Again, this does not hold any longer in a turmoil world. Since
the interaction between the lags of rates can account for these ¯ndings, I now turn
the attention to Granger-causality F tests on the entire system of equations.
The results support the previous ¯nding that the turmoil has changed
6The reader should bear in mind that the analysis carried out in this paper disregards the e®ects
of the communication policy of the ECB on the money market. Trichet (2008) stresses that, during
the ongoing market correction, the ECB has put e®orts in justifying the decisions on liquidity policy
in a prompt way. Rosa and Verga (2008) uses data on the term structure of Euribor futures to show
that the unexpected part of the explanation of policy decisions explains most of the variability of
rates around decision dates.
7The decomposition is based on the standard Choleski decomposition.
12considerably the pattern of interactions between the volatility of longer term deposit
and overnight rates. Before the reform, there is evidence of spillovers in volatility
from the deposit rates to the overnight segment, except for the 1-year rate. With
the turmoil, the overnight segment is completely insulated from movements in
the volatility of the rates at longer maturities. Even more, except for one case,
the evidence of spillovers across longer maturities breaks down. The increase in
segmentation across the entire spectrum of maturities induced by the turmoil is
counterintuitive, as it cannot account for the rise in volatility observed since August
2007.
I now turn to the tail behavior of the realized volatilities. The conditional
autoregressive value-at-risk model of Engle and Manganelli (2004) is used to compute
the conditional quantiles of the realized volatilities. The model takes the form







where ­t denotes the information set at time t. The autoregressive terms of the
quantiles are meant to capture the clustering of volatility that is typical of ¯nancial
variables. Following Cappiello, Gerard and Manganelli (2005), I estimate the time
varying quantiles from the speci¯cation
qt(¯µ) = ¯µ;0+¯µ;1dt+¯µ;2rvt¡1+¯µ;3qt¡1(¯µ)¡¯µ;2¯µ;3rvt¡2+¯µ;4jrvr¡1j: (17)
The dummy variable dt ensures that the periods of high and low volatility have
the same proportion of quantile exceedances.8 Table 8 reports the results from the
tests of comovements in the tails. There is no statistically signi¯cant evidence for
spillovers in volatilities in the upper quantiles for any maturity. The lower tails are
instead characterized by higher comovements only between volatilities of rates at
longer maturities. This supports the ¯ndings from the exogeneity tests
6 Concluding remarks
To the best of knowledge, this paper is the ¯rst academic contribution on the impact
of the ¯nancial turmoil on the Euro area money market. I present preliminary
evidence on how the turmoil has a®ected the transmission of volatility shocks across
the maturity structure. The results indicate that the longer end of the money
8In order to investigate the speci¯cation of the CAViaR model, I compute the DQ test of Engle
and Manganelli (2004). This null of the DQ tests the hypothesis of no autocorrelation in the
exceedances of the quantiles. The speci¯cation with unconditional quantiles is rejected over the
entire domain. The test statistics are not reported for brevity.
13market curve has insulated itself from the shorter maturities. On the other hand,
the probability of transmission of shocks between the longer maturities has increased
during the turmoil.
Several points are critical for this paper. First and foremost, the ¯ndings
presented here are based on the availability of a short sample for the turmoil period.
Hence, as more data become available, the results might change. Second, the policy
relevance of the analysis can be strengthened by considering the management of
crisis carried out by the ECB. It is unclear what role the buoyant supply of liquidity
through long term re¯nancing operations has played and, in particular, whether it
could help to explain the pattern documented in this paper.
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17Table 2: Descriptive statistics for the realized volatilities
1-month 3-month 6-month 1-year
(a) Before August 9 2007
Max 0.77 0.88 0.79 0.91
Min -12.42 -12.71 -9.11 -8.26
Mean -5.029 -4.77 -3.96 -3.52
Stand. dev. 1.97 1.66 1.70 1.82
Kurtosis -0.03 -0.40 -0.51 -0.48
Skewness -0.87 -0.47 -0.93 -0.95
(b) Between December 1 2005 and August 8 2007
Max -3.66 0.828 -2.86 -2.76
Min -12.43 -11.16 -9.11 -8.26
Mean -7.8 -6.63 -6.64 -6.42
Stand. dev. 1.29 1.13 0.83 0.87
Kurtosis 1.13 6.92 7.15 6.33
Skewness 0.09 1.28 2.11 2.22
(c) From August 9 2007
Max -3.95 -0.18 -1.43 -2.75
Min -9.01 -7.03 -7.75 -6.62
Mean -6.35 -5.33 -5.62 -5.27
Stand. dev. 0.79 0.85 0.65 0.59
Kurtosis 0.66 7.74 10.89 1.39
Skewness -0.34 1.53 1.59 0.76
Legend: This table reports the descriptive statistics for di®erent relevant subsamples of
the realized volatilities.
18Table 3: Selected parameter estimates from the VAR model
on m1 m3 m6 y1






























































Legend: Standard errors are reported within brackets. The models are estimated
on daily data for realized volatility and dummies for last days, end of maintenance
period and governing council decision. The order of the VAR is selected through the
Bayesian-Schwartz criterion. The variables read as follow: on realized volatility on the
overnight, 1m realized volatility on the 1-month Euribor rate, 3m realized volatility on
the 3-month Euribor rate, 6m realized volatility on the 6-month Euribor rate, 1y realized





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































20Table 5: Block-exogeneity LR tests, on as a dependent variable
Restrictions Before August 9 2007 From August 9 2007












Legend: This table reports the test statistics and the p¡values (in brackets) from the tests
of block exogeneity. The tests are computed on vector autoregressions on daily data for
realized volatility and dummies for last days, end of maintenance period and governing
council decision. The orders of the VARs are selected through the Bayesian-Schwartz
criterion. The variables read as follow: on realized volatility on the overnight, 1m realized
volatility on the 1-month Euribor rate, 3m realized volatility on the 3-month Euribor
rate, 6m realized volatility on the 6-month Euribor rate, 1y realized volatility on the
1-year Euribor rate.
21Table 6: Block-exogeneity Wald tests, on as a dependent variable

















Legend: The tests are computed on the ¯rst equation of a vector autoregression on daily
data for realized volatility and dummies for last days, end of maintenance period, and
governing council decision. The table reports Â
2 test statistics and p-values (in brackets).
The variables of the VAR are ordered as follows: on realized volatility on the overnight,
1m realized volatility on the 1-month Euribor rate, 3m realized volatility on the 3-month
Euribor rate, 6m realized volatility on the 6-month Euribor rate, 1y realized volatility on
the 1-year Euribor rate.
22Table 7: Granger-causality F tests
Before August 9 2007 From August 9 2007
1y 6m 3m 1m 1y 6m 3m 1m

































































Legend: The tests are computed on a vector autoregression on daily data for realized
volatility and dummies for last days, end of maintenance period, and governing council
decision. The table reports F test statistics and p-values (in brackets). The variables read
as follow: on realized volatility on the overnight, 1m realized volatility on the 1-month
Euribor rate, 3m realized volatility on the 3-month Euribor rate, 6m realized volatility on
the 6-month Euribor rate, 1y realized volatility on the 1-year Euribor rate.
23Table 8: Test of di®erence in tail co-incidences before and after August 8 2007
Maturity Lower tail: µ · 0:5 Higher tail: µ ¸ 0:5
^ ±(0;0:5) ^ ±(0:5;1)
Stat. s.e. Stat. s.e.
1-month { 3-month 7.49 4.11 1.39 3.57
1-month { 6-month 6.24 3.36 -2.26 2.77
1-month { 1-year 3.06 3.35 -1.11 2.98
3-month { 6-month 14.73 4.35 1.22 3.76
3-month { 1-year 10.84 4.24 -0.89 3.49
6-month { 1-year 10.46 5.16 -2.67 4.05
24Figure 1: Realized volatilities (in logs)

















2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
−8
−6
−4
−2
0
1−year
25